NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 45 | Number 4

Article 11

6-1-1967

Constitutional Law -- "Freedom of Association's"
Inapplicability to Greek-letter Fraternities
H. Hugh Stevens Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
H. H. Stevens Jr., Constitutional Law -- "Freedom of Association's" Inapplicability to Greek-letter Fraternities, 45 N.C. L. Rev. 1033 (1967).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol45/iss4/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

1967]

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

1033

variations in the implementation of constitutional protections in
state and federal forums. The Court reasoned that as the first,
fourth, and sixth amendment are enforced according to the same
standards in both,' s it would be incongruous to deny a criminal
defendant the same uniformity of application when considering an
assertion of a fifth amendment privilege.' It is conceded that the
Court's attention was focused on claim rather than waiver of privilege, but it must be remembered that the practical effect of the
federal limitation on the scope of cross-examination is to make
waiver incomplete, leaving a portion of the privilege intact.2" Thus,
whether the restricted rule is considered a part of the privilege or
merely a collateral result of its waiver, it is impossible to disassociate one from the other. Both are interwoven in the trial context
and become a unit for consideration by an accused who must weigh
the advantages of a claim of privilege in light of the consequences of
waiver. As this determination may well depend on the forum because of the variance in cross-examination procedure, the Court's
propensity for uniformity" may render the "wide-open" rule unacceptable.
W. H. FAULK, JR.
Constitutional Law-"Freedom of Association's" Inapplicability
to Greek-letter Fraternities
In April of 1965 the brothers of Sigma Chi fraternity at Stanford University issued an invitation of membership to Kenny Washington, a Negro-thereby breaking with century-old traditions.'
His admittance to the fraternity was contradictory to the "all white"
heritage of Sigma Chi.2 Shortly after Washington's pledging, the
national fraternity suspended the Stanford chapter-the first of a
21
9 378 U.S. at 10.
2 Id. at 11.
20 United States v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966).
21 See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
Sigma Chi was founded at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, in 1855.

13 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 402 (1948).
'A few weeks after Washington's "pledging,"

the national president of

Sigma Chi predicted that no Negro would ever become a member of the
fraternity. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1965, § 1, p. 14.
'The national executive committee of the fraternity stated that the suspension of the chapter had nothing to do with any membership question.
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series of encounters destined to lead eventually to the severance of
all relations between the local chapter and the parent body.4 In
Washington's home city of Denver, newspaper reports of the Stanford upheaval attracted the attention of a member of the Board of
Regents of the University of Colorado. He suggested to the Board
that Sigma Chi's action in regard to its Stanford chapter indicated
that the fraternity was actively violating a resolution adopted by the
Regents in 1956, whereby fraternities practicing racial or religious
discrimination at Colorado were to be placed on probation. The
Regents subsequently ordered the Beta Mu (Colorado) chapter of
Sigma Chi to produce evidence to the contrary. Officers of Beta Mu
appeared at a hearing, but chose to remain silent. On the basis of
the only evidence available--chiefly letters written by the chief
executive officer of the national fraternity and others directly concerned with the Stanford incident-the Regents concluded that
chapters of Sigma Chi were compelled to practice racial discrimination. Beta Mu was placed on probation, including loss of rushing
and pledging privileges, until such time as it complied with the 1956
resolution. Following an unsuccessful attempt by Beta Mu to have
the Regents lift the probation, the fraternity brought an action seeking injunctive relief from the penalty, plus a declaratory judgment
that the Regents had exceeded their authority and that their actions
were unconstitutional and void. In Sigma Chi Fraternityv. Regents
of the University of Colorado,5 a three-judge district court denied
relief, holding that the Regents acted within the scope of their
authority and that there was no violation of the fraternity's constitutional rights of freedom of association or procedural due
process.
The fraternity's argument was grounded primarily in allegations
that enforcement of the 1956 resolution resulted in an unconstitutional abridgment of the group's right of "freedom of association."
This right has received judicial recognition chiefly in NAACP v.
Alabama." In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
According to a statement issued by the national president, the suspension
was based upon the chapter's "contemptousness for the fraternity and its
ritual." Blackwell, How Civil Rights Act Affects Fraternities,COLLEGE AND
UNIv. Bus. 53 (Dec. 1966).
'Id. at 54. The final disaffiliation was the result of a unanimous vote of
the chapter members.
258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).
°357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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state's insistence that the NAACP disclose its membership lists constituted interference with "freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas"-a freedom which the court
equated with freedom of speech and assembly. Sigma Chi argued
that freedom of association as described in NAACP v. Alabama
should be extended to fraternities, and that Colorado protected no
significant state interest by regulating its membership policies. Prior
to its consideration of the right of association issue, the court found
that the Regents' resolution constituted "state action"-a finding
vital to two separate determinations in the case. First, it was necessary to describe the resolution as a "statute" in order to invoke the
jurisdiction of a three-judge Federal panel under 28 U.S.C. § 2281.'
Second, it was necessary to describe the Regents as having sufficient
authority to assert the state's interest. To reach these conclusions,
the court here relied primarily on a statutory provision that "The
Board of Regents shall have the general supervision of the university, and the exclusive control and direction of all funds and appropriations to the university."8
Having reached the essential constitutional question, the court
asserted that "the right of association is not

. . .

an absolute right,"' 9

and reviewed a number of cases upholding the right in order to
determine whether it should be extended to Sigma Chi."0 These
cited cases applied the right of association doctrine to problems of
state interference with political, economic, religious, or cultural interests similar to those protected in NAACP. The court characterized
its crucial determination as whether freedom of association necessarily carried with it the advancement or promotion of ideas. Could
it be applied "in relation to a social organization having no broad
'See McWood Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 237 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.M.
1965).
'COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 124-2-10 (1963).
'258 F. Supp. 515, 525 (D. Colo. 1966).
"°The court cited NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), in which a
Virginia statute regulating the solicitation of legal business was held violative of freedom of association because litigation was essential to the
NAACP's attempts to obtain its legal and political objectives; Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), which couched freedom to travel
in terms of associational rights; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), which extended Button to the right of unions to
"associate" for the preservation of their rights by recommending lawyers
for injured members; and Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), holding
that state oaths of allegiance for public employees bore no logical relationship to attempts to inhibit subversive organizations.
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public interest objectives .... ?"11 The three-judge panel concluded
that the right of association had never been applied expressly to a
social fraternity. Then, faced with the apparent necessity of either
rejecting or accepting such an application, the court only skirted the
issue. It turned its attention to Webb v. State University of New
3 both of which upheld
York12 and Waugh v. Board of Trustees,"
absolute prohibitions of fraternities by state universities as proper
means to promote a state's interest in supervision and control of its
educational institutions. The 1956 Colorado University resolution,
it said, was aimed at this same state interest. Sigma Chi's assertions
in regard to its own freedom of association were noted only in the
comment that "if the right exists it is a relative one." The court
took notice of two factors tending to reinforce the finding of a
valid state interest: the University's positive interest in eliminating
racial discrimination, and the fact that Sigma Chi's penalty appeared
"mild" when compared to the absolute prohibitions allowed in Webb
and Waugh.

Finally, apart from the issue of freedom of association, the
court resolved the due process problem in the Regents' favor. It
held that Sigma Chi's failure to avail itself of the opportunity to
make a showing barred any complaint of unfairness, and that sufficient evidence was available to sustain the Regents' conclusions.
Noting that Beta Mu was "in the middle" in the case, the court
concluded:
...we

are powerless to remedy this. Our function is to consider

the constitutional validity of the action taken. We have found
that it is valid. The fact that the Regents could possibly have
in solving this problem
proceeded with more diplomacy or skill
14
is not a matter for our consideration.
It is unfortunate that the court in the present case did not assert
itself with more finality in regard to the question which it raised
regarding the applicability of freedom of association to organizations lacking public objectives.15 Nevertheless, the decision is im1 258 F. Supp. 515, 525 (D. Colo. 1966).
125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).

',

13237 U.S. 589 (1915).

11 258 F. Supp. 515, 529 (D. Colo. 1966).

"It is important to note that the NAACP cases arose in contexts of

interference with such interests as political, economic, religious, or cultural

interests, although it does not appear that the right of association is neces-
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portant. The court strongly implies, despite averments to the contrary, that the .right should be applied only to protect political or
philosophical interests like those in NAACP. This implication reflects the balancing performed by the court, and its decision that
the university's interest-here, the eradication of racial discrimination-outweighs the fraternity's right to select members free of
state regulation. Extension of freedom of association to Sigma Chi
would have had the effect of using the doctrine to further public
racial discrimination, in complete opposition to its application in
NAACP. Thus, although Sigma Chi appears to add little substantive law to the holdings in the Waugh 6 and Webb11 cases cited
by the court, it does apply certain elements of the right of association doctrine to the previously untouched problem of fraternity
8
racial discrimination.1
sary limited to such objectives." 258 F. Supp. 515, 525 (D. Colo. 1966)
(emphasis added).

18237 U.S. 589 (1915). In upholding a legislative prohibition of all
fraternities at state schools, the court said at p. 596-597: "It is to be remembered that the University was established by the state, and is under the

control of the state, and the enactment of the statute may have been induced
by the opinion that membership in the prohibited societies divided the attention of the students, and distracted from that singleness of purpose which
the state desired to exist in its public educational institutions."
125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
18 The problem has had widespread impact in recent years, although the
instant case reflects the only reported litigation. Sigma Chi alone has had
several chapters involved in controversies, and five have left the fraternity
in recent years. News Release, Stanford University News Service, Nov. 10,
1966. President Barnaby Keeny of Brown University (himself a member
of Sigma Chi) ordered the chapter there to sever all ties with the national
because of the presence of a "social acceptability" clause in the fraternity's
constitution. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1965, p. 28. The clause which he found
offensive to the University's principles states:
Every chapter owes a duty to every other chapter, to the whole fraternity and to any man considered for membership, for as long as it
continues to hold a charter in Sigma Chi, to refrain from proposing
for membership to our fellowship any person who for any reason is
likely to be considered personally unacceptable as a brother by any
chapter or any member anywhere.

Constitution of Sigma Chi Fraternity, Art. VIII, § 1. (Rev. 1965) (emphasis

added).
With the exception of this "mutually acceptable" clause, Sigma Chi retains no patent restrictions on chapter membership policies as of this writing.
The official pledge-initiation report on every pledge filed with the national
fraternity by local chapters contains no references to race and does not
require that a picture be attached.

The impact of the discrimination problem is clearly not limited to the
official reactions of college or fraternity officials. Some important social
attitudes seem to be changing as well. Former congressman Brooks Hays,
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Several aspects of the general problem of fraternity discrimination were left unexplored by in Sigma Chi. One authority has argued that a state acts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
when it gives official recognition at state universities to fraternities
with discriminatory membership policies.' 9 Similar views are reflected in Congressional debates concerning the possibility that federal funds be withheld from otherwise qualified institutions where
such fraternities exist. Although the statutory language is subject
to differing conclusions,2" at least one high-ranking federal authority has interpreted federal law as authorizing such withholding of
funds.2 ' Whatever the actual intent of the current statutory provisions, numerous educational institutions have invoked them as the
impetus for regulations similar to the 1956 resolution of the Colorado Regents.2" It would appear that the most significant impact of
a member of Sigma Chi, told the National Interfraternity Conference in
1965:
For us to lag in moving toward this goal [racial equality in fraterni-

ties] is to leave the undergraduate confused about the American

dream of equality of opportunity. We do not want the Greek letter
fraternity, which is an integral part of the American educational
system, to fall behind. . . . Surely it is apparent that the quiet but
profound social revolution now taking place has penetrated college
life. We cannot afford to close our eyes and ears to it.
A recent report of the pledging of a Negro student at Davidson College,
Davidson, N.C. by Sigma Chi is demonstrative of the substantial changes
now being wrought within traditional fraternity precepts. No action has
been taken in the matter by the national fraternity. See The Charlotte Observer, Feb. 17, 1967, p. 1.
"0Horowitz, Discriminatory Fraternitiesat State Universities-A Violation of the Fourteenth Anendnwnt? 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 289, 295 (1952).
" The Higher Education Act of 1965 provides that no federal authority
may be exercised over the membership or internal operations of "any fraternal organization, fraternity, sorority, private club or religious organization
at an institution of higher education . . . which is financed exclusively by
funds derived from private sources and whose facilities are not owned by
such an institution." 79 Stat. 1270, 20 U.S.C. § 1144 (1965). The House
version of this provision originally extended it to any of the listed organizations at any institution of higher education. Thus the Congressional language seems clearly to reflect an intent to provide for the possibility of
federal control at publicly supported institutions. See U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 2, 4141 (1965).
" James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, announced in 1965 that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(providing for withholding of federal grants and subsidies from recipients

practicing racial discrimination), colleges would be required to furnish as-

surances of compliance, and that racial discrimination by a fraternity would
invalidate such assurances. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1965, § 1, p. 14.
" When a nondiscriminatory provision was instituted at the University
of North Carolina in 1965, the campus newspaper commented:
[University officials] have voiced their concern that discriminatory
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the decision in Sigma Chi will be similarly pragmatic. No doubt college authorities will adopt it as a lever for implementing both the
letter and spirit of judicial determinations supporting racial equality
in public educational institutions.3
H.

HUGH STEVENS, JR.

Constitutional Law-Current Trends in Recidivist
Statute Procedures
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the convictions of three Texas petitioners and in so doing upheld the constitutionality of the common law procedure in applying recidivist
statutes.' The petitioners urged that due process was violated when
it was explained to each juror on voir dire examination that the
state was contending the petitioners had been convicted of similar
crimes earlier, and further that they were deprived of an impartial
trial and jury when the present indictment containing allegations
of the prior convictions was read and evidence of the prior convictions put to the jury at trial.2 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held
that because the jury was instructed not to consider past criminal
conduct in deciding present guilt that minimum constitutional demands were met.3
The case should be of interest in North Carolina since it sustains
the same procedure used here.' It should also encourage a re-examiclauses might be injurious to the University's position with the Federal Government because the fraternities are chartered by this institu-

tion. If this legal connection is strong enough to place the University
in jeopardy under the .1964 Civil Rights Act, then the clauses clearly
will have to go.
The Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 17, 1965, p. 2.
" See McClaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The three cases disposed of
1 Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
are reported below as Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Spencer
v. Texas, 389 S.W.2d 304 (1965); Bell v. Texas, 387 S.W.2d 411 (1965).
'Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4-5, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
'87 Sup. Ct. at 653.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-147 (1965) ; State v. Lawrence, 264 N.C. 220, 141
S.E.2d 264 (1965); State v. Morgan, 263 N.C. 400, 139 S.E.2d 708 (1965);
State v. Painter, 261 N.C. 332, 134 S.E.2d 638 (1964) ; State v. Powell, 254
N.C. 231, 118 S.E.2d 617 (1961); State v. Stone, 245 N.C. 42, 95 S.E.2d
77 (1956); State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 427, 75 S.E.2d 242 (1953); State v.
Davidson, 124 N.C. 839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899).

